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In a recent issue of Conflict Quarterly, Richard A. Gabriel observed 
that the initial defense policy thrust of the Reagan administration has con-
centrated on the "two least likely employment scenarios" — a limited/ 
general nuclear war or a conventional war in Europe — while neglecting 
preparation for the "types of war that the United States is likely to be 
called upon to fight in the next two decades."' While it is critical that the 
U.S. re-establish the credibility of its strategic and NATO deterrents, it is 
true that in the international arena of the 1980s the U.S. is more likely to 
be confronted by a series of unconventional challenges and problems in the 
highly unstable non-Western, non-industrialized world. 
These situations, recently labeled "low intensity conflicts," could take 
the form of rural or urban guerrilla wars, civil wars, separatist movements, 
communal violence, insurrection, coup d'état, or terrorism, to identify the 
most frequently used tactics.2 To respond effectively to such challenges, 
the United States will require a range of both military and non-military 
assets not found in our conventional military capabilities. It is on this point 
that Gabriel comes to the crux of the problem: "American forces today 
lack the doctrine, tactics, experience and even manpower to fight a 
successful unconventional war in El Salvador or anywhere else.'" Since the 
withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973, an integrated U.S. unconventional 
response capability (composed of both military and non-military assests) 
has been non-existent. This is not surprising, given the American military's 
long-term propensity for avoiding unconventional warfare strategy, as well 
as the post-Vietnam constraints placed on American foreign and military 
policy. However, the effects of not developing appropriate assets may be 
very costly, especially as the Soviets and their satellites and surrogates 
have been deeply involved in promoting low-intensity conflicts. 
This article will examine three issues arising from Gabriel's article: one, 
the impact of the Vietnam war on the American political and military 
establishments; two, the kind of military and non-military assets and 
strategies the U.S. must develop if it is to be prepared to respond effective-
ly to low-intensity conflicts in the 1980s; and three, the potential political 
constraints the Reagan administration may face if it decides to deploy 
such capabilities. 
Impact of Vietnam on the US Political-Military Establishments 
The 1970s were characterized by an inverse relationship between Soviet 
growth and American decline in capacity to project power and employ it in 
low-intensity conflicts.4 The most frequently cited reason for this American 
disinclination to employ military power is attributed to the disillusion-
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ment resulting from our Vietnam experience. This frustration led to a 
revulsion within the American regime toward extending power and 
employing force in international politics, overturning a foreign policy 
consensus which had existed since the second world war. It is to these 
"lessons of Vietnam" and the constraints they have placed on U.S. foreign 
and defense policy that we now turn. 
In the foreign policy sphere, disillusionment over the American involve-
ment in Vietnam led to a complete reappraisal of U.S. policy. This 
resulted in the rejection of two important principles: one, that East-West 
conflict was the major cause of the tension in world politics; two, that the 
permanent nature of this conflict compelled the U.S. to pursue a policy 
that contained Soviet ambitions. Central to this second theory was a 
strong and flexible military capability that could be employed, when neces-
sary, to parry the power projection of the Soviets or their surrogates. In 
effect, the "utility of force" was recognized and accepted as the primary 
means for containing the Soviet commitment to the permanency of con-
flict with the West. 
These developments, in turn, had secondary impacts. For many scholars 
and analysts, responsibility for the cold war was now attributed, in large 
part, to the United States. Additionally, the Soviets were no longer viewed 
as a revolutionary-imperial power, but as a nation whose intentions were 
the same as those of other nations in the international system. This led to 
support for a policy of détente and consequently, de-emphasis of the tradi-
tional calculations of military power, preparedness, and willingness to 
employ it. This was all passé, for détente signalled the emergence of an 
international order based on pluralism and economic interdependence. 
While the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine laid the foundation for détente and 
a new American foreign policy, it was the Carter administration that 
sought to fashion a human rights-based policy that would address the 
multitude of economic, social, and political problems facing all nations. 
For both administrations, the problem of motivating the Soviets to play an 
active role in this new international order was to be accomplished by 
providing them with economic incentives they could not resist (i.e., grain 
and technology). That the Soviets were receptive to such inducements was 
due to "moderating" tendencies believed to be at work in the Soviet 
regime. These were said to include: 
1. A willingness to be bribed or persuaded into adopting a far less 
conflict-oriented framework for the conduct of foreign relations. 
2. An acceptance of arms control as a crucial means of defusing a major 
source of East-West tensions. 
3. A tendency for Soviet foreign and defense policies to be modified 
benignly as the scientific-industrial revolution increased the bargain-
ing power of technocratic elites/interest groups/pressure groups, and 
as a simple consequence of the aging of the regime. Time would 
therefore be on the side of the West. 
4. Agreement that war between the Soviet Union and the United States 
could not serve Soviet interests.5 
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An important sign of this moderation was the fact that the Soviets not only 
agreed to take part in SALT negotiations, but actually signed a treaty 
limiting the deployment of strategic weapons.6 
If the rejection of post-war foreign policy grew out of disillusionment 
with American involvement in Vietnam, the foundation for our post-
Vietnam foreign policy was derived, in part, from certain new theories of 
world politics that were proposed during the last decade. For the creators 
of these theories, many of whom found their way into policy circles, power 
politics gave way to a new version of a theme whose roots can be traced to 
18th century Enlightenment optimism, 19th century liberalism, and 20th 
century Wilsonian idealism.7 While it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
examine these in detail, the basic premise assumes that traditional power 
politics has run its course and is being replaced by an international system 
characterized by economic interdependence. 
The penetration of this theme into Carter foreign policy is readily ap-
parent. One has only to recall the emphasis placed on the North-South 
dialogue, détente, human rights, and economic interdependence. This 
penetration was equally apparent in the area of defense policy, where 
administration officials argued that military force was rapidly declining in 
utility. This was especially true in the area of low-intensity warfare. 
It should not be surprising that the political lessons drawn from the 
Vietnam experience also directly affected the military lessons derived by 
the United States. The result was a significant revision in the scope of U.S. 
military strategy, force posture, and contingency planning. 
Following its withdrawal from Vietnam, the U.S. reduced its military 
manpower by 35%, altered its force planning doctrine, developed the "total 
force", and increased its reliance on nuclear weapons.8 Pre-Vietnam force 
planning had been predicated upon the assumption that the military would 
be prepared to fight two major wars and one minor contingency simul-
taneously (2½ wars). Since 1970, U.S. doctrine has been based on the 
assumption that we would never have to wage more than one major and 
one minor war at the same time (1½ wars).9 Presumably, this minor war 
included those types of conflict the Pentagon referred to as "limited 
contingencies" (requiring the deployment of irregular paramilitary forces). 
However, given the declining number of American forces deployed abroad, 
its shrinking international base structure, increased reliance on weapons 
for high intensity warfare, and domestic public opinion, the possibility of a 
sudden American power projection into a low intensity conflict seemed 
increasingly remote. In fact, it was rather uncertain precisely what types of 
"limited contingencies" fell within the boundaries of the "one-half war" 
concept. 
How did such doctrinal shifts affect force structure and capabilities? 
According to Theodore Shackley, the United States's ability to conduct 
low-intensity actions "has withered into virtual uselessness."10 The 
appropriate assets for conducting such operations can be divided into three 
categories: one, economic development and military assistance programs; 
two, intelligence personnel skilled in paramilitary and other clandestine 
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procedures; and three, specialized military units trained in counter-
insurgency and unconventional warfare methods. An examination of the 
current U.S. inventory will demonstrate the impact of this doctrinal shift 
on our capacity to conduct low-intensity warfare. 
To begin with, significant cutbacks in security and development as-
sistance were enacted during the 1970s. Ironically, as U.S. security as-
sistance programs were steadily decreasing, Soviet employment of such 
tactics was rapidly accelerating." The importance of such assistance in 
Third World conflicts is exemplified in the recent Soviet sea and airlift of 
arms to Ethiopia in 1978.12 The U.S. began to seriously scale down its 
commitment to security assistance programs under the Nixon doctrine, 
and this process was accelerated as a result of the mid-1970s Congres-
sional assault on these programs. Additionally, Congress began to stipu-
late that those who did receive such support had to conform to U.S. 
human rights standards. The Carter administration lent executive sup-
port to such stipulations after 1976. 
Cuts in security assistance were accompanied by reductions in security 
assistance personnel. For instance, the number of Military Assistance 
Advisory Groups (MAAG) deployed abroad was significantly reduced. 
These were replaced by much smaller Military Training and Technical 
Assistance Teams. Funded entirely by Foreign Military Sales and Inter-
national Military Education and Training Program funds, these lacked the 
scope and complexity of the MAAG units. 
The various forms of development aid the U.S. provided to Third World 
nations during the 1960s was also severely restricted in the 1970s. If the 
1960s was the "decade of development" in which the U.S. employed such 
assistance as an instrument of foreign policy in the struggle for the Third 
World, the 1970s saw drastic revisions.13 Foreign aid was no longer to be 
linked to American strategic and political objectives or carefully targeted 
through bilateral dissemination. Instead, it was now to be channeled 
through such multilateral assistance agencies as the World Bank group.14 
As with security assistance, in bilateral cases conformance with U.S. 
human rights standards was a prerequisite. 
A second important unconventional warfare asset, the paramilitary and 
counterinsurgency elements of the Central Intelligence Agency, also 
experienced significant reductions. After 1947, the CIA maintained a sig-
nificant paramilitary capability, primarily tasked for counterinsurgency 
operations. During the 1960s, this was employed primarily in Southeast 
Asia.15 Additionally, it was used in support of guerrilla warfare operations, 
as well as for furnishing covert military assistance to unconventional 
foreign forces and organizations. 
During the 1970s, the CIA became a central target in a comprehensive 
and critical review of American foreign policy. Roy Godson notes that this 
"centered largely around real and alleged American intelligence abuses, 
and particularly violations of American civil liberties by American intel-
ligence agencies."16 Attention was also directed at the U.S. covert action 
policy during the cold war, including paramilitary operations.17 The end 
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result of these investigations was a decision on the part of the Carter 
administration to drastically weaken the covert action capability. This 
decision had important organizational and personnel ramifications for the 
CIA, the extent of which is spelled out by Shackley: "budgetary pressures, 
particularly under Admiral Stansfield Turner's stewardship of the intel-
ligence community, forced drastic personnel reductions and maintained 
equipment inventories at levels below what are necessary to sustain the 
third option (paramilitary operations), if it were selected for implementa-
tion."18 In sum, according to a former senior CIA official, "covert action 
in the late 1970s shows all the hallmarks of a dying art form."19 
Finally, reductions also weakened the Special Forces, the third critical 
element in a unified unconventional warfare capability. From a high of 
over 9,000, the size of the Special Forces declined to approximately 2,000, 
following their 1971 withdrawal from Vietnam.20 Recently, they have 
increased to three 1,400-soldier groups stationed in the United States. 
However, according to one expert, serious problems still remain: 
"There are serious shortages. . .particularly in officers, communica-
tions personnel, and medical specialists. First term enlisted person-
nel are filling non-commissioned officer positions and many posi-
tions are filled one or two grades below authorizations. As a result, 
although this low-intensity capability is déployable, some skill levels 
are below those desired. Language capabilities are particularly lack-
ing. . . .Two additional limitations on the capabilities of Special 
Forces deserve note. The first is the difficulty of attracting trained 
officers for second and third Special Forces assignments. . . .The 
second concerns training priorities for Special Forces units. Current 
training places top priority on the employment of Special Forces 
teams in unconventional warfare in a general war environment."21 
The declining size and changing role of the Special Forces strongly reflects 
the post-Vietnam decision to avoid low-intensity conflict. 
What are the ramifications of these developments? It could be argued 
that such doctrinal and force structure decisions send signals to our allies 
and potential allies, as well as to our adversaries, about the commitment of 
the United States to respond to those unconventional conflicts that 
threaten its interests. In fact, the developments described above might be 
construed as a unilateral commitment by the U.S. to refrain from defend-
ing interests in those parts of the globe where we might confront an uncon-
ventional enemy. The political and organizational depth of this reluctance 
to develop a coherent and coordinated policy for such situations is re-
flected in the now flawed Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). Originally 
tasked to respond to a range of challenges spanning irregular, paramilitary, 
limited and conventional conflict, the scope of the RDF has continually 
narrowed since its inception. In February 1981, Thomas Etzold suggested 
that "it would be difficult if not impossible to use elements of the RDF in 
the Southern Hemisphere, and in large portions of Asia, the Pacific, and 
even the Indian Ocean."22 It is designed mainly to block any Soviet ad-
vance towards the Persian Gulf. 
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This then was the situation at the beginning of the Reagan term. 
Whether the new administration will alter these developments remains to 
be seen. We now turn to consideration of options for improving the U.S.'s 
capability in low-intensity conflict. 
Prerequisites for Unconventional Warfare 
The U.S. must correctly assess the nature of the various low-intensity 
conflict situations most likely to threaten its interests. While it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to identify each of the possible forms of unconven-
tional conflict, Sam Sarkesian has listed the following catagories: Employ-
ment of Force (noncombat); Surgical Operations; Guerrilla I (weapons as-
sistance teams, police training, advisory teams); Guerrilla II (special 
forces teams, cadre for indigenous forces); Guerrilla III (integration of 
U.S. combat units & indigenous forces); Vietnam Type situations.23 Prin-
cipally, this categorization covers those situations in which the U.S. would 
assist a friendly government confronted with an unconventional conflict. 
However, Shackley has recently suggested that the U.S. should prepare 
for involvement in both insurgency and counterinsurgency situations. 
According to Shackley, the U.S. role is too frequently confined to the 
latter — assisting friendly regimes to endure. Given the unconventional 
conflict environment of the 1980s, he argues the U.S. may find it necessary 
to assist guerrilla movements such as the Afghan resistance or UNITA in 
Angola.24 
In view of the complexity and diversity of these forms of conflict, the 
U.S. cannot prepare for all contingencies. Robert Tucker has recently 
observed that the U.S. is "in the throes of a far reaching change in the 
nation's foreign policy. . . a period of withdrawal. . .has come to an end. If 
it is to be succeeded by a period of an America everywhere resurgent and 
activist, we will only risk jeopardizing interests that are critical to the 
nation's security and well-being."25 This underlines the importance of 
accurate threat assessments and of a flexible and responsive military train-
ing machine. Strategy and capabilities must be geared for specific situa-
tions, whilst retaining flexibility. The assets necessary for developing 
"response packages" fall into three categories. How they are configured 
strategically will depend on the specific situation. 
1. Economic and Military Assistance Programs. 
The bilateral economic assistance programs should be re-established. 
Over the last ten years the U.S. has drastically reduced these pro-
grams, opting instead to channel such support through international 
multilateral assistance agencies. As a first step in developing capa-
bilities for responding to unconventional challenges, foreign eco-
nomic assistance should be redirected for use in a bilateral manner. 
Many conflicts are, in part, rooted in the underdeveloped economic 
and social environment characteristic of Third World nations, which 
may lead to internal breakdown. Consequently, economic develop-
ment assistance, if applied appropriately, is an important part of any 
counter-insurgency-civic action program. This would be true for 
Guerrilla I-III categories. Beyond assisting friendly governments 
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threatened by internal war, U.S. commitment to such programs 
sends signals to both friendly and unfriendly governments. Recent 
statements by Secretary of State Haig,26 as well as Congressional 
support for President Reagan's foreign aid appropriation bill,27 
indicate that the administration is committed to employing such as-
sistance in a bilateral fashion. Whether it is indicative of a recommit-
ment by the U.S. to respond to unconventional challenges is unclear 
at this time. Additionally, the Reagan administration's support for 
military security assistance should be extended, either in the form of 
military equipment, or training teams, or both. Unlike the long-term 
objectives of economic development aid, security assistance is de-
signed to address short-term security problems. This will require a 
renewed commitment by the U.S. Army to language and cultural 
education as well as civic action techniques.28 
2. Intelligence Assets. Various paramilitary intelligence assets 
constitute a second important part of an American capacity to con-
duct unconventional war. The CIA's clandestine service once main-
tained such an organizational structure and skilled paramilitary 
personnel. However, these assets were largely dismantled during the 
general assault on the CIA that took place during the latter half of 
the 1970s. The end result of this, according to one former expert, has 
been the severe dilution of "CIA's ability to handle this task. . .The 
limited capability that now exists is not adequate to meet the 
challenge of the 1980s."29 To respond to unconventional conflicts in 
the 1980s, these paramilitary intelligence assets should be re-
established, albeit under close political control. There must be skilled 
personnel and an organizational structure within which the tech-
niques of insurgency and counterinsurgency can be employed, if the 
current administration chooses to exercise this option. While the 
intelligence contribution will vary according to the type of conflict, as 
well as on the basis of its stage of progression, the most important 
ingredient is skilled personnel who can "develop irregular warfare 
concepts, test new techniques for conducting operations, plan force 
structures, recruit, train and equip indigenous forces."30 While it is 
relatively easy to re-establish economic and security assistance pro-
grams, the re-structuring of the CIA's paramilitary assets may 
prove difficult and time-consuming. However, if the U.S. is to main-
tain an effective unconventional capability, this should be under-
taken. It must not be at the expense of intelligence gathering capa-
bility, which remains the most important single task in all counter-
insurgency work. 
3. Military Forces. As the intensity of the unconventional conflict 
escalates, the U.S. may have to consider introducing military forces. 
To prepare for this, the Special Forces (SF) should be upgraded. To 
begin with, the SF mission must be re-focused primarily for organiz-
ing, advising, and assisting either friendly government or resistance 
forces in unconventional techniques. Necessary actions include re-
emphasizing specific area, cultural and language training for priority 
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regions, removing career disincentives and overcoming manning 
shortages, and shifting the emphasis of officer training so that uncon-
ventional warfare is seen as a legitimate and vital role for a modern 
army. If U.S. military commitment to such a conflict expanded 
beyond the SF, counterinsurgency would once again be everyone's 
role. If the French, British and other armies can train for global and 
unconventional war, there is no reason why the U.S. Army should 
not do likewise. Without such a change of training emphasis, SF will 
not attract and keep officers for second and third tours, and uncon-
ventional warfare will remain outside the Army's definition of con-
tingencies for which to be prepared.31 Finally, U.S. military assets 
should continue to include forces for raids and special operations of a 
"surgical" nature, such as the Israelis at Entebbe and the French in 
Shaba in 1978. The failed Iranian rescue operation demonstrated the 
importance of such specialists, as well as the formidable demands 
made upon them. Close liaison with clandestine forces should be 
fostered, for operational efficiency and to avoid departmental 
rivalry. 
Political Constraints and Limitations 
The role of force in the American foreign policy of the 1970s was 
characterized by restraint and disenchantment. During the same period, 
the Soviets operated under the purely pragmatic restraint of avoiding no-
win situations: whenever they saw a profitable opening, they took it. The 
Soviets demonstrated a sophisticated politico-military capacity to conduct 
low-intensity conflict. Mainly through surrogates and advisers, they have 
been able to influence events in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America 
and South-East Asia. 
In the international security environment of the 1980s, the United 
States is likely to encounter various unconventional challenges to its 
interests. Accumulating the means with which to meet such challenges is 
entirely within our capability. But unless the national will is also mobi-
lized, such forces might remain unused or, worse still, they might fail in 
their missions. American military intervention continues to weigh heavily 
on the minds of important political actors, as well as on the general public. 
This has most recently been apparent in the growing opposition to U.S. 
involvement in El Salvador.32 
If the Reagan administration is to establish and employ such a politico-
military strategy, it must develop public support for it. This will not be 
easy, in the aftermath of Vietnam. Prior to the late 1960s, such support 
could have been rallied on the basis of the foreign policy consensus. How-
ever, in the 1980s this no longer exists. Although President Reagan has 
recovered support for a renewed U.S. defense effort, this may not extend 
to the type of interventionist operations that may be called for if we are to 
pre-empt or defeat similar Soviet tactics. The moral issues are often 
cloudy; the "enemy" usually takes the form of a peasant guerrilla army 
rather than Soviet troops; the interests at stake, taken one area at a time, 
are difficult to describe as absolutely vital. And, perhaps more significant 
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still, the American public has no confidence in our ability to succeed in 
such endeavours. The spectre of our being drawn, deeper and deeper, into 
an open-ended military disaster lies close to the surface of the American 
psyche. These are relevant concerns, but they do not remove the other 
danger, that by doing nothing to halt the Soviets in the low-intensity field 
we may end up isolated in a hostile world, deprived of raw materials and 
energy. Perhaps greater attention should be given to the lowest end of the 
spectrum of conflict, to the pre-emptive use of aid and advice, to the 
clandestine, to the psychological, and to the use of proxy forces. America 
has to face these difficult issues and, in debating them, a new consensus 
may emerge. 
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